We use data on 1,294 banks in emerging Europe to analyse how bank ownership and the Vienna Initiative affected credit growth during the 2008-09 crisis. As part of the Vienna Initiative western European banks signed country-specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain exposures and to support their subsidiaries in emerging Europe. We show that in general both domestic and foreign banks sharply curtailed credit during the crisis, but that foreign banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative were relatively stable lenders. We find no evidence of negative spillovers from countries where banks signed commitment letters to countries where they did not.
Introduction
The start of the transition process in 1989 heralded the large-scale entry of foreign banks into emerging Europe. Western European banks with saturated home markets were attracted to the transition region due to its scope for financial deepening and its ample growth potential. Policy-makers and development institutions stimulated financial integration because of its presumed positive impact on the efficiency and stability of local banking systems. The empirical evidence that emerged over the next two decades suggests that foreign bank entry indeed stimulated competition and transferred know-how (Fries and Taci, 2005; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011) and that foreign banks were relatively stable credit sources during local financial turmoil (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006) .
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 put this model of intense cross-border banking to the test. The crisis was unique in that it emanated from the home markets of the banking groups operating in emerging Europe. Although few of these large banks had direct US sub-prime exposures, most of them were affected by the sharp reduction in interbank liquidity as of the second half of 2007. Banks started to deleverage both at home and abroad, a process that accelerated after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012) . It became increasingly uncertain whether multinational banks, now battered by problems elsewhere, would keep funding eastern European customers through their local subsidiaries.
In response to these mounting pressures, Western governments supported various banks with guarantees as well as capital and liquidity injections towards the end of 2008. This alleviated concerns about a credit crunch "at home" but did not reduce worries about a retrenchment of multinational banks from emerging Europe. On the contrary, concerns were raised that government support came with "strings attached".
Anecdotal evidence suggests that banks were indeed asked to focus on domestic lending (Kamil and Rai, 2010) . For instance, French banks that received state support had to increase domestic lending by 3-4 per cent annually, while Dutch bank ING announced that it would lend US$ 32 billion to Dutch borrowers in return for government support (World Bank, 2009, p. 70) .
Tightening funding constraints and potentially biased government interventions raised concerns about an uncoordinated rush of banks out of emerging Europe. Although most banks confirmed their commitment to the region during the early stage of the crisis, there was no formal policy framework or coordination mechanism in place to ensure these commitments were credible. The fear was that while it would be in the collective interest of banks to roll-over debt to emerging Europe, the absence of a coordination mechanism could lead individual banks to withdraw, ultimately causing a "run" on the region. The absence of agreements on how to share the burden of a defaulting subsidiary between the fiscal authorities in the home and host countries further exacerbated the risk of such a run. The accompanying decline or reversal in financial flows would not only have had dire consequences for local firms and households but would also have led to large exchange-rate fluctuations and balance of payments problems.
In response to this institutional vacuum, the Austrian government and a number of multinational banks with high exposure to emerging Europe started to engage in informal discussions towards the end of 2008. The goal of this Vienna Initiative (VI) 1 was to avoid collective action problems (Pistor, 2011) and to guarantee macroeconomic stability in emerging Europe. Soon the VI meetings also included the In return for these countries' commitment to keep their programmes on track and for financial support under the Joint IFI Action Plan, a number of multinational banks signed country-specific commitment letters in which they pledged to maintain crossborder exposures and to continue to provide credit to firms and households. To do so, banks confirmed that they would keep subsidiaries adequately capitalised and provide them with sufficient liquidity. The VI thus developed into a comprehensive publicprivate partnership that combined macro-financial support by the IMF and the European Union (a "bail-out") with funding by various development institutions and a coordinated "bail in" of private lenders.
Although a large-scale, uncoordinated withdrawal of banks from emerging Europe did not materialise -and the VI can therefore be considered successful stricto sensu -as yet virtually no empirical analysis has been undertaken to assess its impact. 2 No evidence is available on the role played by banks that were part of the VI versus those that were not. Likewise, for those multinational banks that were part of the VI, no comparison has been made between their lending behaviour in countries where they signed commitment letters and countries where they did not. It also remains unclear whether signing commitment letters may have led to negative spillovers to other countries.
We employ a comprehensive bank-level dataset to fill these gaps in the literature. This is important as part of a thorough ex post evaluation of the VI and of the effectiveness of private-sector "bail-ins" more generally. Our results also inform the current policy debate on similar initiatives against the background of the European sovereign debt crisis and its negative effect on international bank lending. With "Vienna 2.0" in the making, it is important to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the original Vienna Initiative.
Our empirical results indicate that both foreign and domestic banks sharply curbed credit growth during the crisis. While we find no impact of home-country state support packages on lending by foreign bank subsidiaries, we do find that banks that took part in the VI were relatively stable lenders. Moreover, VI banks did not retrench from non-VI countries in order to maintain exposures to countries where they signed commitment letters. If anything, participation in the VI led to positive rather than negative spillover effects to other countries. Finally, state-owned domestic banks were relatively stable lenders during the financial crisis.
These results allow us to contribute to three strands of the literature. First, we shed light on the implications of foreign bank entry for financial stability. Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) Lelyveld (2010) present similar evidence for a broader set of countries and banks. In line with these findings, Dinger (2011) shows for emerging Europe that the presence of multinational bank subsidiaries eases aggregate liquidity shortages during local crises.
As regards the role of multinational banks as shock transmitters, Rosengren (1997, 2000) demonstrate how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990 led Japanese bank branches in the United States to reduce lending. Schnabl (2012) analyses how the 1998 Russian crisis spilled over to Peru as banks, including multinational bank subsidiaries, saw their foreign funding decline and had to reduce local lending. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) find similar evidence for US banks.
More recently, studies have started to assess whether multinational banks also transmitted the 2008-09 crisis across borders. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2011) use an international dataset and find that multinational bank subsidiaries curtailed credit more aggressively than domestic banks. Domestic banks, which relied more on local deposits to fund credit growth, were better positioned to continue to lend. In line with this, Popov and Udell (2012) show how multinational banks transmitted the crisis to emerging Europe and that the severity of shock transmission depended on the strength of parent banks' balance sheets. Ongena, Peydró and Van Horen (2012) also focus on emerging Europe. They use data on bank-firm relationships and show that not only foreign banks but also domestic banks that before the crisis had borrowed in the international wholesale markets, had to cut back lending more during the crisis. Yet, Barba Navaretti, Calzolari, Pozzolo and Levi (2010) stress that multinational banks were a stabilising force in Europe as they displayed a relatively stable loan-to-deposit ratio. Their analysis focuses on the years 2007-08 while, as we show in this paper, much of the reduction in lending only took place in 2009. Second, our paper adds to the empirical literature on the impact of state support and state ownership on credit growth. Rose and Wieladek (2011) find for the recent crisis that foreign banks in the United Kingdom reduced their lending and increased interest rates when they were nationalised in their home country. Brei, Gambacorta and Von Peter (2011) provide evidence that suggests that recapitalisations during the global financial crisis did not boost bank lending except for those banks with a capital ratio above a certain threshold. Micco and Panizza (2006) show that lending by state banks is less procyclical than lending by private banks as governments use state banks to smooth credit over the business cycle. Mian (2006) also finds that lending by state banks is less volatile in the face of macroeconomic shocks. Our paper provides a systematic comparison of foreign, private domestic and state banks, to assess the impact of state ownership and state support during the recent crisis.
Third, our results provide evidence on the possible catalytic effect of crisis funding by an international lender of last resort like the IMF. A theoretical literature has developed to understand the conditions under which (limited) IMF funding, by acting as a seal of approval of a country's reform efforts, may help close an external funding gap and prevent a balance of payments crisis. Such a catalytic effect materialises if an IMF programme nudges private creditors to roll over their commitments. Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2003) show how contingent support can reduce the range of economic fundamentals at which international investors find it optimal to withdraw from a country. In a similar vein, Morris and Shin (2006) demonstrate that catalytic finance works if it provides a country with incentives to keep up adjustment efforts without distorting creditors' roll-over decisions.
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of contingent support is scarce. Cottarelli and Giannini (2002) conclude that IMF interventions typically result in only small increases in private capital. Corsetti and Roubini (2004) analyse a number of case studies and draw a slightly more positive conclusion. They highlight two relative success stories, Korea (1997) and Brazil (1999) , where IMF lending was accompanied by roll-overs of interbank credit lines (in Korea short-term interbank lines were converted into longer and government-guaranteed bonds). In both cases -similar to the VI -roll-overs were neither completely voluntary nor uncoordinated (as in a 'pure' catalytic approach) and systems were put in place to monitor roll-over rates.
The official sector organised a concerted private sector involvement to resolve collective action problems. We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides more details about the VI, after which Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 then explains our empirical methodology and Section 5 summarises our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
without real "bite" did not succeed in stemming a sharp reduction in international bank exposure to Brazil. A similarly soft monitoring arrangement in Turkey in 2002 proved to be a paper tiger as well (Roubini and Setser, 2004, p.150) .
The Vienna Initiative
The VI came into being in the autumn of 2008 when fears were growing about the vulnerability of emerging Europe to withdrawals by multinational banks. 4 Rapid credit growth before the crisis had left the private sector in many countries highly leveraged. A sharp reduction in multinational banks' funding to their subsidiaries would not only have caused a reduction in lending and asset prices, but most likely would also have led to severe macroeconomic destabilisation.
In November 2008 a number of pan-European banks with a large presence in emerging Europe sent a letter to the European Commission, copying the EBRD and EIB, to call for a quick and coordinated response to the problems in emerging Europe and, more specifically, to ensure sufficient funding for banks operating in the region.
In response the VI was created as a coordination platform for multinational banks, their home and host country supervisors, fiscal authorities, the IMF and development institutions to safeguard a continued commitment of parent banks to their subsidiaries. In aggregate, the institutions committed to a funding package of €24.5 billion to support large cross-border banks. By the end of September 2009, banks had received 4 Table A7 in the Annex provides a timeline of the VI. 5 Impromptu coordination was necessary since burden sharing in the case of a failing European crossborder bank effectively depends on ex post negotiations between countries. Such improvised cooperation (Freixas, 2003) or ex post bargaining is prone to coordination failures. 6 See www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2009/090227.shtml for details.
€16.3 billion of IFI support in the form of senior loans, tier 1 and 2 capital, trade finance, facilities for small business loans and syndicated loans.
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The Joint IFI Action Plan was embedded in a broader policy coordination framework by linking it to the IMF and EU stabilisation programmes. IMF programmes were introduced in various countries when substantial amounts of foreign currency debt matured and external financing gaps opened up. Part of this debt was issued by multinational banks active in the region and insufficient roll-overs would have compromised the success of IMF-EU balance of payments stabilisation programmes.
The authorities were wary not to substitute commercial funding with public sector money; the goal was to keep commercial banks "bailed in" rather than bailed out. As the crisis subsided, pressure to maintain cross-border exposures was reduced and some roll-over commitments were lowered by early 2010.
At the time concerns were expressed that the focus of the commitment letters on five core countries could tempt multinational banks to support these countries by withdrawing funds from countries without exposure commitments (such as Poland and the Czech Republic). Negative spillovers could have contributed to the crossborder transmission of the crisis (Keller, 2009; Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo, 2010) . These concerns were alleviated by a number of informal agreements that extended the informal commitments of EBRD-supported banks to emerging Europe as a whole. Moreover, in September 2009 and March 2010 "horizontal meetings" were held with various multinational banking groups as well as the relevant national and international authorities (see Table A5 in the Annex). The focus of these meetings was on lending to the region as a whole rather than the five countries with an IMF/EU programme and explicit exposure commitments.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our main data consist of a panel of balance sheet and income statement data for 1,294 banks in emerging Europe during 1999-2009. 10 The source is Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database and all data are denominated in US dollars to ensure comparability across banks. We disregard banks for which we have less than three consecutive years of data. The panel is unbalanced as we do not have information for each bank in each year. For the crisis year 2009 the dataset contains 1,098 banks. We combine these data with macroeconomic information from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
In addition, we hand-collect information on crisis-related government support to banks in both home and host countries. We take this information from various publications by the European Commission 11 and IMF, Reuters news service, and bank web sites. We capture support in the form of capital injections, bank-specific guarantees, and asset sales to the government. For each bank we also analyse whether one or several of the three main development institutions operating in emerging Europe -the EBRD, World Bank Group and the European Investment Bank -were lending to the bank or had an equity participation in it before the crisis. subsidiaries by parent banks, we then use data from year t onwards. For subsidiaries that are the result of a takeover, we only use data from year t+1 onwards. In this way we take into account that after a take-over the influence of the new parent bank is not immediate but only noticeable when the integration process is well under way. If parent banks merge during year t we include the merged entity from t+1 onwards for similar reasons.
Our main dependent variable is annual gross nominal credit growth. We define gross nominal credit as net loans plus loan loss reserves. This definition corrects for changes in (net) loans that are not due to changes in banks' output of new loans but are caused by changes in loan loss provisioning and write-offs.
12
If certain banks provisioned more during the crisis than others, this should therefore not bias our dependent variable. The same holds for state banks that may have provisioned very little and instead "ever-greened" non-performing loans. To exclude observations related to mergers and acquisitions we trim the 1 per cent observations with the highest loan growth. Table 1 12 Our results continue to hold when we use net loans as our dependent variable (see Table 4 ). 13 For instance, VTB -Russia's second largest (and state-owned) east, foreign and domestic banks had been growing at similar rates before the crisis, but domestic banks had to cut lending more once the crisis struck. Tables A1 to A3 in the Annex provide variable Tables A4 and A5 in the Annex provide an overview of the banks that participated in the VI and the specific countries in which they signed commitment letters.
Importantly, in each of the five VI countries there were two groups of foreign bank subsidiaries: those with parents that were part of the VI in that country and those with parent banks that were not. For instance, in Hungary UniCredit and Raiffeisen Bank signed a commitment letter whereas Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank did not.
The table also shows variation among subsidiaries according to whether their parent banks received government support or not. For instance, Commerzbank received capital support from the German government whereas Deutsche Bank did not.
Moreover, note that parent banks signed commitment letters in some countries but not in others. Erste Bank signed a letter in Hungary but not in Serbia. Similarly, NLB Bank committed to rollovers in Bosnia and Herzegovina but not in Serbia. These are the sources of between-bank and within-bank variation that we exploit in this paper.
The decision of a parent bank to participate in the VI and to sign commitment letters in specific countries was not random. Table A6 provides a probit analysis to analyse what determined a bank's VI status. We assess the impact of both parent bank and subsidiary characteristics. The results indicate that large banks -in terms of both the asset size of the subsidiary and the regional exposure of the parent bank (number of subsidiaries in emerging Europe) -were more likely to be part of the VI. Parents of subsidiaries with relatively low loan quality (high loan-loss reserves) were also more likely to sign commitment letters as were parent banks with lower tier 1 capital ratios.
These results indicate that while VI banks were on average larger, they were also less well capitalised, and carried more non-performing loans. These selection effects therefore stack against us finding a positive impact of the VI on credit growth during the crisis. They also indicate that it is important to control for bank characteristics in order to minimise the risk of omitted-variables bias.
Empirical methodology
We start our empirical analysis by reporting a set of panel regressions for the period 1999-2009 to analyse whether foreign bank subsidiaries continued to be relatively stable providers of credit, as they had been during earlier local crises, or whether they were more fickle during the recent crisis. In each specification we include timevarying bank-ownership dummies -OWN ijt -to distinguish between domestic private banks (the control group), state banks and foreign banks.
14 In addition, we construct five time-invariant Vienna participation dummy variables.
 The first one, VIENNA COUNTRY j indicates whether a country was one of the five VI countries.
 Second, VIENNA PARENT ij , specifies whether the parent bank of subsidiary i in country j signed one or more VI commitment letters (in country j or elsewhere). To the extent that host country inflation increases the nominal value of loan portfolios there would be a positive effect of inflation on credit growth. However, as we convert our data to US dollars, inflationary effects should disappear to the extent that PPP holds. Since inflation differences are usually not immediately and fully offset by adjustments in the nominal exchange rate, we include the inflation rate as a regressor to ensure that we adequately correct for inflation-fuelled growth in nominal loan portfolios.
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Summarising, our baseline panel-regression specification looks as follows:
(1) 
., T i where T i is the number of years in the sample for bank subsidiary i.
We estimate this specification using OLS with bank-specific fixed effects (Hausman tests indicate that the bank individual effects are significantly correlated with the explanatory variables) and robust estimators to correct for heteroscedasticity. We include year fixed effects to control for global trends that influenced all banks simultaneously.
Second, we run a set of cross-section regressions where the dependent variable is bank-specific credit growth in 2009 to analyse the impact of the Vienna Initiative in more detail. We now limit the sample to the five countries that participated in the VI and focus on foreign bank subsidiaries only. Since each of these countries contain several subsidiaries, we can include country fixed effects to rigorously control for credit demand at the country level. 16 This is important because the crisis hit the real economy of countries to a different extent and with a different lag. Firms' credit demand to finance working capital and investments was consequently affected to varying degrees. This allows us to examine, within the same country, how lending by banks that signed a commitment letter differed from banks that did not sign a letter.
This cross-sectional specification looks as follows: Table 2 shows panel regressions to analyse the relationship between bank ownership structure and credit growth before and during the crisis. 17 We explain about 30 per cent of the variation in banks' annual credit growth rates. The top panel shows that before the crisis, foreign banks grew significantly faster than domestic banks, exceeding their annual rate of growth by as much as 20 percentage points.
Empirical results
This holds even when controlling for a battery of other (lagged) bank characteristics.
In line with our expectations, these controls show that large banks, banks with an already high loan-to-deposit ratio, and banks with high loan loss reserves (that is, worse loan quality) grew slower on average. More solvent, liquid and profitable banks expanded credit more quickly. As expected, credit growth was positively correlated with the business cycle -a proxy for credit demand at the host-country level.
During 2008, foreign banks were the first to sharply curb their credit growth (column 4) and this brought them back in line with the average growth rate of private domestic banks (column 1). 18 Domestic bank lending slowed mainly in 2009, when the temporary decoupling of emerging markets from economic trends in the developed world came to an end. Interestingly, while state banks also had to slow down credit in 2009 (column 3), this reversal was less sharp when compared with private banks (column 1). This may reflect that in some countries governments used state-owned banks to smooth aggregate lending when privately owned banks started to deleverage. 17 Column (1b) replicates column (1a) while including year fixed effects. 18 The sum of the coefficient for Foreign bank and Crisis 2008*Foreign bank is just above or below zero (depending on the inclusion of year fixed effects). Also note that unreported regressions indicate that government support did not have an independent effect on foreign bank lending (see also Tables 4  and 5 Next, in Table 3 we start to investigate whether the Vienna Initiative had a stabilising effect on foreign bank lending during the crisis. Using the same panel data as in Table   2 , we explore how lending during the crisis differed between banks and countries inside and outside the Vienna Initiative. To keep the table concise, we only report the interaction terms between the crisis years and the VI variables. However, all specifications include the separate components of these interaction terms, timevarying bank controls (the same as in Table 2 ), as well as bank and year fixed effects.
In the last three columns we also include parent-bank characteristics as controls. The first (last) three columns shows regression estimates based on the whole sample (foreign-bank sample). We can now also interact both crisis dummies with Vienna parent to check whether VI banks behaved differently during the crisis, both before (2008) This links back to our earlier observation that VI participants were the banks that had been growing the fastest before the crisis (and were larger as a result) but were also less well capitalised and had a weaker loan portfolio.
The interaction term between
( Interestingly, however, in 2009 these banks had stabilised and there is even statistically weak evidence that they now decelerated less when compared with domestic banks and non-VI foreign banks (column 1). To look into this in more detail, column 3 compares VI foreign banks with non-VI foreign banks while leaving out all observations on domestic banks. The picture is similar: compared with non-VI foreign banks, credit growth of foreign banks that were part of the VI was about 10
percentage points higher (all else equal).
In Table 4 provides a number of robustness tests on column 3 of Table 3 , which we reproduce in column 1 here. In the second column we only include banks for which we have at least seven years of subsequent observations to make sure our results are not driven by banks with just a few data points. Our results on the stabilising effect of (3) in T able 3 (here repeated in column 1). Column (2) shows a specification which only includes observations where we observe at least seven years of data for a bank. Column (3) shows a specification with panel-corrected standard errors which combine bank-level heteroscedasticity with an AR(1) process. Column (4) shows a specification using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Column (5) shows a specification using the Hausman and T aylor (1981) estimator. Column (6) shows a regression where the dependent variables is net instead of gross loan growth. Column (7) shows a regression where the dependent variable is growth of total assets. Column (8) In the next column we report estimates with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE, cf. Beck and Katz, 1995) which allows us to correct for bank-level heteroscedasticity and an AR(1) process in the error structure. Again, our results do not change materially. In columns 4 and 5 we show the same specification using a Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator and a Hausman and Taylor (1981) instrumental variable estimator, respectively. Here our results hold as well.
In columns 6 and 7 we replace gross loan growth with net loan growth (that is, we adjust for provisioning) and growth in total assets, respectively. In the first case our results continue to hold. In the second case we find that the positive effect of a parent bank that signed in another country disappears. This may indicate that the Vienna Initiative -and in particular the Joint IFI Action Plan that supported banks' ability to continue lending to firms and households -may have pushed participating banks to continue lending while taking compensating measures to shorten their balance sheet in other ways. Finally, column 8 includes a government support dummy. Our results continue to hold although the state support dummy itself is highly insignificant.
Next, Table 5 reports cross-sectional regressions for 2009 on a sample of foreign bank subsidiaries in the five VI countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia. We include host-country fixed effects to control for local demand conditions. This allows us to compare, within the same host country, subsidiaries of banks that signed a commitment letter in that country with those that did not (while controlling for parent bank and subsidiary covariates). Columns 1-3 (4) (5) (6) show regressions with credit (asset) growth on the left-hand side.
We find among foreign banks in VI countries a clear positive relationship between signing commitment letters on total credit and asset growth in 2009. As in the panel regressions, we do not find a separate impact of government support on credit and asset growth. In contrast, even when we control for various parent bank and subsidiary characteristics, including average pre-crisis growth rates, we continue to find a strong and substantial effect of parent banks' commitment letters on subsidiary lending. Finally, the control variables show that, as expected, bank lending was lower for large subsidiaries, subsidiaries with weaker balance sheets (as indicated by higher proportions of loan loss reserves), and subsidiaries that grew faster before the outbreak of the crisis. 
Conclusion
We use a comprehensive dataset with detailed information on 1,294 banks in emerging Europe to analyse the determinants of credit growth during the 2008-09 crisis. We focus on the impact of bank ownership structure and access to government support, either through capital injections by home-country authorities or through participation in the Vienna Initiative.
We find that foreign bank subsidiaries reduced their lending somewhat earlier, in In all, we conclude that the Vienna Initiative, an ad hoc coordination mechanism, was a relatively successful example of catalytic funding where public funds provided by the IMF, EU and various development institutions were complemented by a coordinated (but non-coercive) bail-in of private-sector lenders. This not only helped countries to close their external funding gaps at the macroeconomic level but also, as we show in this paper, to soften the inevitable deleveraging process in emerging Europe and to prevent a uncoordinated "rush to the exit".
During earlier crises that originated in emerging Europe itself, parent banks proved to be a source of strength and their subsidiaries actively stabilised local lending. In this paper, we show that during the recent crisis, when parent banks were hit by severe funding shocks at home, foreign bank subsidiaries had to rein in credit growth relatively fast when compared with their high pre-crisis growth rates (bringing credit dynamics in line with those of domestic banks). Because subsidiaries are financially integrated into a group structure, their lending reacts to developments in other parts of the group and when parent banks are hit by a funding shock, this may translate into a reduction in lending by their foreign subsidiaries. One implication of these intra-bank financial linkages is that (national) supervisory authorities need to coordinate their policies and supervisory activities across borders. Coordination mechanisms that were set-up before the crisis have proven insufficient and ineffective in the strongly integrated banking markets of emerging Europe. This resulted in the need to set up an ad hoc coordination mechanism during the crisis, the Vienna Initiative.
Unfortunately, regulatory reform and cooperation in the wake of the 2008-09 crisis has only proceed very slowly. As a result, when in 2011 Western European banks experienced significant funding constraints and were once more under pressure to deleverage, and even to sell local subsidiaries, the need was felt for a "Vienna 2.0".
While this new effort will focus again on the short-term task of preventing an uncoordinated and excessive decline in bank lending in the region, the focus will also be on moving the cross-border banking model of emerging Europe in the direction of a new banking model that relies more on local sources of funding.
Better coordination, cooperation and information-exchange between supervisors are not only necessary to prevent spillovers of financial shocks, but also because the alternative -forcing highly integrated pan-European banking groups to hold more capital and liquidity in each individual subsidiary-may be costly. "Ring-fenced" subsidiaries are first of all costly to the bank groups themselves, because the sum of ring-fenced pools of capital will be larger than the current group capital as banks can no longer exploit the benefits of international diversification.
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At the macroeconomic level, there may be costs involved too because ring-fenced subsidiaries would impede the efficient functioning of banks' internal capital markets. The ability of multinational banks to raise funding where it is cheapest and allocate it to the most worthy investment projects contributes to a more efficient international allocation of capital.
Ideally, one would like to move towards an integrated supervisory regime that would allow banks to set up multinational networks of branches and subsidiaries through which capital and liquidity can be allocated to its most productive use. At the same time, supervisors should be able to adequately respond to local shocks that hit a banking group and that may have knock-on effects to other parts of the group. At a minimum, such supervisory "integration" could take the form of more harmonisation and a strengthening of the colleges of supervisors on multinational banks, as well as setting up (ex ante and binding) burden-sharing agreements (see for instance Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009) . A more efficient and effective resolution of cross-border banks in trouble could be tackled by a resolution fund at the EU level or a network of national resolution funds. The most far-reaching solution would entail the creation of a pan-European supervisor for large groups. This could be supplemented by adequate capital and liquidity regulation as well as host-country macroprudential supervision able to curb externally funded credit booms.
Whatever policy option will be chosen, forced "subsidiarisation" through ring-fencing -basically cutting up multinational banks into strings or independent "local" banksmay be a second-best option that reflects the inability of national supervisors to reach a satisfactory level of cross-border cooperation and burden sharing. Having said that, in particular in emerging Europe many foreign bank subsidiaries will gradually need to move towards a funding policy that relies more on local bank funding and less on parent-bank funding. This requires the development of local capital markets, which will allow banks to "top up" domestic deposit funding with local wholesale funding if and when required. Note: T his table shows probit regressions to estimate the likelihood of participation in the Vienna Initiative. Column (1) estimates, at the subsidiary level, the probability that the parent bank of subsidiary i signed a commitment letter in country j . Column (2) estimates, at the subsidiary level, the probability that the parent bank of subsidiary i signed a commitment letter in at least one VI country. Column (3) estimates, at the parent-bank level, the probability that a parent bank signed a commitment letter in at least one VI country. All independent variables are defined in T able A1. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. Source: BankScope, IMF IFS, EBRD, bank websites, authors' calculations. 
